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I. Introduction 
The arena of international sports law is vast and far-reaching, 
transcending national borders through the love of sport.  But, this 
simple love is not enough to prevent international conflicts and 
disputes.  In 2018, a Belgian Court of Appeals declared that 
“enforced arbitration” to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)1  
is illegal, as related to a 2015 complaint filed by the Belgian football 
club, RFC Seraing, and the investment fund, Doyen Sports, against 
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) over 
Third Party Ownership (TPO) rules.2  Specifically, the Belgian 
Court of Appeals ruled that the arbitration agreement in FIFA’s 
contract with RFC Seraing violated Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Article 47 of the European 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law.  Editor in Chief, North 
Carolina Journal of International Law.  
 1 The Court of Arbitration of Sport (CAS) is also referred to as the Tribunal Arbitral 
du Sport (TAS), https://www.tas-cas.org/en/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/2JD9-CXDP]. 
 2 Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, Aug. 29, 2018, 2016/AR/2048, 
Vaja 1227181 (Belg.).  Note that the original transcript has yet to be formally published 
and was only printed in French.  The decision was translated from French to English 
through multiple translation resources, but it is not to be interpreted as a formal translation. 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights.3  What is most interesting about the 
decision was “the examination of validity of the arbitration clause 
enshrined in the FIFA Statutes. . . . [which, under Belgian law, was 
found] to be too broad to be valid since the scope is not limited to a 
‘defined legal relationship’.”4 
The institution of interest in this matter is the CAS, an 
international arbitral body that hears appeals from international 
sports federations.5  While the CAS is recognized internationally as 
the arbitral of last resort for global sports,6  parties are required to 
formally accept the CAS’s jurisdiction in their respective contracts 
according to the statutes or regulations of the governing sports-
related body.7  Within these contract negotiations between the 
players and the federations, there is little bargaining power allocated 
to the players,8 forming a relationship built on unequal footing and 
ending in rulings subject to little review or oversight.9   
The Belgian Court of Appeals ruling questions the legitimacy of 
 
 3 James Diamond, Brussels Court Rules “Enforced Arbitration” of CAS is Illegal, 
INSIDE THE GAMES (Sept. 9, 2018), 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1069768/brussels-court-rules-enforced-
arbitration-of-cas-is-illegal [https://perma.cc/HA74-RE5R].  
 4 Despina Mavromati, The Validity of FIFA’s Arbitration Clause and the 
Independence of the CAS: A Detailed Review of the RFC Seraing Cases, LAW IN SPORT 
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/content/articles/item/the-validity-of-fifa-s-
arbitration-clause-and-the-independence-of-the-cas-a-detailed-review-of-the-rfc-seraing-
cases [https://perma.cc/UMA9-YG37]. 
 5 See Court of Arbitration for Sport, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. 
S12 (2017) (Eng.) [hereinafter CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION]. 
 6 See History of the CAS, TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL DU SPORT/COURT OF ARBITRATION 
FOR SPORT (TAS/CAS), https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-
cas.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3TW3-GXZF]. 
 7 See CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION, C1, S12 (2017) (Eng.). 
 8 See Leonardo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport, in 236 BEITRÄGE ZUM AUSLÄNDISCHEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING ON PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 439–40 (Armin von Bogdandy 
& Ingo Venzke eds.) (2012). 
 9 Jennifer R. Bondulick, Rescuing The “Supreme Court” of Sports: Reforming The 
Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Member Selection Procedures, 42 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 275, 295–96 (2016) (“The new provisions of the 1994 CAS Code create the 
appearance of institutional independence and good governance for CAS. While these steps 
gives the appearance of impartiality, there is still debate as to whether CAS masks the 
IOC’s influence. . . . Therefore, the scales are still tipped significantly in favor of the 
controlling governing bodies and against the individual athletes.”).   
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arbitration clauses requiring automatic appeal to the CAS.10  
Automatic appeals from large international federations are a 
foundational principle of the tribunal, and the international sports 
world would be altered dramatically if the CAS’s authority were 
seriously questioned.  While this ruling is limited in its scope, it 
opens the door to discussing the movement of these cases from the 
appellate forum chosen by clubs, typically the CAS, to domestic 
courts on challenges to their arbitration clauses.11  The Belgian 
Court’s analysis of the arbitration clause through “a strict and 
objective interpretation of the arbitration clause enshrined in the 
FIFA statutes” turns attention to the broad scope of arbitration 
clauses;12 these clauses often lack the specificity of a defined legal 
relationship and are often the result of unequal bargaining.  While 
similar challenges have been presented in the past with little 
institutional change, this case further shines a light on systemic 
issues that risk the integrity of sports and athletes around the world. 
Analysis will proceed in seven parts.  Part I describes the 
structural framework of the CAS and its parent organization, the 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS).  Part II breaks 
down the RFC Seraing and FIFA dispute and covers the ICAS’s 
response to the Brussels Court of Appeal’s decision.  Part III 
provides a legal analysis of the jurisdictional issues that may be 
impacted by this decision.  Part IV presents the foreseeable 
implications of this case to the international sports world.  Part V 
analyzes elements of the CAS that run counter to American legal 
tradition and suggests flaws in its organization.  Part VI proposes 
institutional changes that could strengthen the CAS amidst doubts 
of its authority.  Part VII concludes the paper with a reflection on 
the future of the CAS and why despite its controversial nature, its 
presence is vital to the future of international sports. 
 
 10 See generally CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181. “Unless it is clear 
from the outset that there is no arbitration agreement referring to CAS, the CAS Court 
Office shall take all appropriate actions to set the arbitration in motion. It shall 
communicate the request to the Respondent, call upon the parties to express themselves on 
the law applicable to the merits of the dispute and set time limits for the Respondent to 
submit any relevant information about the number and choice of the arbitrator(s) from the 
CAS list, as well as to file an answer to the request for arbitration.”  CODE OF SPORTS-
RELATED ARBITRATION, R39 (2017) (Eng.) (referencing the need for an explicit arbitration 
clause calling for automatic appeals to the CAS to be agreed upon by both parties).  
 11 See generally CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181.  
        12 Mavromati, supra note 4. 
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II. Background 
Sports law is a unique sector of the legal field that “presents a 
mixed nature, in which a regulatory framework based on private 
autonomy interacts constantly with public law norms.”13  This area 
of law “is highly heterogeneous, and, above all, it is not simply 
transnational, but actually ‘global’: it is made of norms enacted not 
only by States, but also by central sporting institutions . . . and by 
national sporting bodies.”14  The reach of global sport is expansive, 
spanning across 508 million people, and comprising more than 3% 
of world trade and 3.7% of combined Gross National Product 
(GNP) in the European Union.15  The expansive nature of sports 
parallels the nature of sports rules that are “genuine[ly] 
[characterized as] ‘global law’ because they are applied across the 
entire world, they involve both international and domestic levels, 
and they directly affect individuals.”16  International sports law thus 
presents a multi-dimensional legal field that is distinctive in nature, 
with an evolving character that adapts to the constant changes in 
sport globally. 
Sports do not just transcend national borders, they also operate 
in a global arena that directly reaches individuals on a personal 
level.  Everyone from players and coaches, to spectators and ESPN 
viewers, are exposed to sports everyday through many platforms.  
Allegiances on teams are formed, loyalties are tested, and 
individuals become emotionally and even financially invested in 
their team’s success.  As a result, we all feel part of a collective that 
transcends state and national borders.  The CAS aims to centralize 
rules that are then instituted by sports federations in their respective 
states and nations, enabling this collective to effectively operate on 
an international scale.17   
 
 13 Casini, supra note 8, at 440. 
 14 Id. at 441. 
 15 Ian Blackshaw, The Role of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Countering 
the Manipulation of Sport, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
MANIPULATION IN SPORT 223, 223 (Markus Breuer & David Forrest eds., 2018) (explaining 
the expansive reach of global sport as ultimately comprising 5.4% of the EU labor force 
(15 million people)). 
 16 Casini, supra note 8, at 439. 
 17 See Frequently Asked Questions, TAS/CAS, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-
information/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited August 13, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/AEE5-84D7] (“The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an institution 
independent of any sports organization which provides for services in order to facilitate 
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The CAS is a unique tribunal that is unlike any other 
adjudicatory body.  It was created in 1983 with a mission to “build 
a centralized mechanism of international judicial review in sport,” 
namely to introduce a “supreme court for world sport.”18  Calling 
for this need was an increasing number of international sports 
disputes and the lack of an independent body to handle them “in a 
flexible, quick, inexpensive and binding manner.”19  Unfortunately, 
the original CAS began as a “sort of judicial branch within the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) with the latter maintaining 
political and financial control over the former” and the inability to 
truly operate as an independent and insular entity.20  The CAS was 
later reformed by the IOC to its modern institution during the 1994 
Paris Agreement.21   
The modern-day CAS represents a coexistence of different 
jurisdictional models resembling a civil court with commercial law 
cases, an administrative court when deciding against sports 
federation decisions, a constitutional court when resolving conflicts 
of the Olympic movement, and a criminal court when handling 
doping violations.22  Overlooking the CAS is its governing body, 
the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS).23  After 
original pushback from international federations and other sporting 
arbitration institutions that resisted the formation of a uniform court, 
“the CAS defeated its opponents, gained independence and brought 
normative harmonization in[to] global sports law.”24  This 
“normative harmonization” stemmed from the international sports 
world finally having an insular judicial body to provide uniform 
rulings.25  
 
the settlement of sports-related disputes through arbitration or mediation by means of 
procedural rules adapted to the specific needs of the sports world.”). 
 18 Casini, supra note 8, at 445. 
 19 Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 225. 
 20 Casini, supra note 8, at 446. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id. at 450 (“The CAS, in fact, resembles a civil court when it deals with 
commercial law cases (such as player transfers), an administrative court when it has to 
decide claims against sporting institutions’ decisions, a constitutional court when it must 
resolve conflicts between different institutions of the Olympic movement, and even a 
criminal court when it has to balance evidence in doping violations.”).  
 23 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. S2 (2017) (Eng.). 
 24 Casini, supra note 8, at 444. 
  25  See id.  
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When handling appeals, the CAS seeks “to resolve through the 
appeals arbitration procedure disputes concerning the decisions of 
federations, associations or other sports-related bodies, insofar as 
the statutes or regulations of the said sports-related bodies or a 
specific agreement so provide.”26  Specifically, “[a]n appeal against 
the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may 
be filed with CAS if the statutes . . . provide or if the parties have 
concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has 
exhausted the legal remedies available.”27   
The CAS’s jurisdiction extends to disputes “involving national 
federations, affiliated clubs and individual members that concern 
private, nontechnical rules and statutes of the IFs [International 
Federations].”28  Jurisdiction requires an arbitration agreement that 
“represents the legal basis and legitimation for a CAS intervention” 
and only with a valid arbitration clause can the CAS hear cases.29  
Generally, municipal courts will “recognize and enforce CAS 
awards, primarily under the New York Convention on Arbitral 
Awards.”30  The New York Convention requires “national courts of 
signatory countries to enforce valid arbitration awards if the parties 
agreed in writing to arbitrate their dispute.”31  Because of the 
promise of this uniform body for international sports, many 
international federations amended their statutes to establish the CAS 
as “the exclusive, final tribunal for appeal of decisions.”32  Today, 
the CAS’s status as the “arbitral of last resort” assumes an 
unprecedented capacity to compel all major federations to enforce 
automatic appeals to its tribunal.33   
Once a case is appealed, the CAS panel “has full power to 
review the facts and the law,” deciding the case through the law 
 
 26 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. S12(b) (2017) (Eng.). 
 27 Id. at R47. 
 28 James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and 
Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 508 (1992). 
 29 Casini, supra note 8, at 459. 
 30 Id. (referring to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards as the “New York Convention”). 
 31 MATHEW MITTEN et al., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 297 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 4th ed. 2016). 
 32 Nafziger, supra note 28, at 508. 
 33 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 17 (“The CAS has the task of 
resolving legal disputes in the field of sport through arbitration. It does this pronouncing 
arbitral awards that have the same enforceability as judgements of ordinary courts.”). 
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chosen by the parties or “according to the law of the country in 
which the federation, association or sports-related body . . . is 
domiciled . . . [or] that the Panel deems appropriate.”34  These 
arbitrations take the form of de novo review, and once concluded, 
they extend binding and final opinions.35  The CAS’s decisions may 
“replace[] the decision challenged or [may] annul the decision and 
refer the case back to the previous instance.”36  The award issued by 
the Court “shall be final and binding upon the parties . . . [and] [i]t 
may not be challenged by way of an action.”37  CAS decisions can 
only be challenged if the circumstances give rise to legitimate 
doubts over the arbitrator’s independence or over his or her 
impartiality.”38  These challenges are ultimately determined by the 
ICAS Board.39   
While the CAS’s decisions are binding, they do not hold 
precedential value as “no panel is bound by preceding decisions 
issued by other panels.”40  However, there is still extreme deference 
given to the CAS’s previous decisions, and the CAS panels tend to 
follow their past jurisprudence and possess persuasive authority.41  
These decisions create a “judge-made sport law” that is often 
referred to as lex sportiva and consists of decisions rendered by the 
CAS that create a set of principles and rules specifically addressing 
sport.42  The meaning of lex sportiva has extended over time to refer 
more “generally to the transnational law produced by sporting 
 
 34 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R57–58 (2017) (Eng.); See also 
CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R45 (2017) (Eng.) (“The Panel shall decide 
the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a 
choice, according to Swiss law.”). 
 35 DAVID MCARDLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPORT 48 (2018). 
 36 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R57 (2017) (Eng.). 
 37 Id. arts. R46, R59. 
 38 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R34 (2017) (Eng.). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Casini, supra note 8, at 457. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 441.  See also Annie Bersagel, Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport? An Analysis of Published Awards for Anti-Doping Disputes in 
Track and Field, 12 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. L. J. 189, 206 (2012) (“At a minimum, the 
CAS’s exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving international-level Olympic 
athletes, as well as the emergence of a body of CAS jurisprudence independent of national 
legislation [lex sportiva], has already led to the emergence of a distinctively autonomous 
system of global private regulation.”). 
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institutions.”43  With the continuing growth of lex sportiva, the 
“CAS is building up a discrete body of jurisprudence . . . 
introducing a measure of legal certainty for the benefit of all those 
in the worldwide sporting community, who rely on the intervention 
of CAS in the settlement of their disputes.”44 
III. Legal Analysis 
The case at issue involves RFC Seraing, a Belgian football club, 
and Doyen Sports, a private equity fund involved with the financial 
management of football players and coaches, against the Fédération 
International de Football Association (FIFA), the European 
Football Union (UEFA), the Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Association (URBSFA – the governing body of football in 
Belgium) – and the International Federation of Professional 
Footballers (FIFPRO).45  The original dispute arose in 2015 when 
“Doyen Sports Investments Ltd. signed an agreement with RFC 
Seraing in which the club transferred the economic rights of three 
players to the firm for a payment of 300,000 Euros . . . [to become] 
the owner of 30 percent of the financial value stemming from the 
players’ rights.”46  This transfer of rights violated FIFA’s third-party 
ownership (TPO) ban, leading RFC Seraing & Doyen to challenge 
the legality of FIFA’s ban on the basis of EU competition law in a 
Belgian court.47  The purpose of FIFA’s ban on TPO was to prevent 
third parties from having economic ownership rights over players, 
thus interfering with FIFA’s larger economic control over its 
players.48  FIFA then brought disciplinary proceedings against RFC 
Seraing on the basis of this TPO contract, alleging a violation of 
FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), 
while imposing a four-year transfer ban on RFC Seraing.49  RFC 
Seraing and Doyen Sports appealed FIFA’s decision to the CAS, 
who then applied the FIFA RSTP and Swiss law to determine that 
 
 43 Casini, supra note 8, at 442. 
 44 Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 245. 
 45 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 9 ¶ 9.  
 46 Zachary Zagger, Sport Court Denies Its Arbitration was Declared ‘Illegal,’ 
LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://lawlibproxy.ad.unc.edu:2147/articles/1081696/sport-
court-denies-its-arbitration-was-declared-illegal- [https://perma.cc/2V9L-6A7Y]. 
 47 Mavromati, supra note 4.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.  This decision was later confirmed by the FIFA Appeal Commission. 
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FIFA’s sanctions were proportionate to the violation.50  RFC 
Seraing and Doyen then subsequently filed an appeal before the 
Brussels Court of Appeals, challenging the legitimacy of the CAS 
as a true arbitral tribunal.51 
On August 28, 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeals issued a 
ruling that rejected FIFA’s arbitration clause requiring automatic 
appeal to the CAS.52  RFC Seraing successfully argued both the 
“generality” of the arbitration clause and the general prohibition on 
state courts as illegal and contrary to public order.53  From the FIFA 
Article of Agreement, any recourse to an ordinary court is 
prohibited, except as specifically provided for in the FIFA 
Regulations.54  Moreover, RFC Seraing connected the adverseness 
to public policy with the requirements of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).55  Specifically, Article 6.1 of the ECHR 
entitles all individuals to “to a fair and public hearing . . . by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law,”56 under 
which RFC Seraing believes the CAS does not qualify.  
The Brussels Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause 
binding the parties to the appellate jurisdiction of the CAS is too 
generic and contains no “defined legal relationship.”57  The clause 
at issue (#59 Obligations relating to dispute resolution) reads: 
The confederations, member associations and leagues shall agree 
to recognise CAS as an independent judicial authority and to 
ensure their members, affiliated players and officials comply with 
the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to 
intermediaries and licensed match agents; Recourse to ordinary 
courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the 
FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types 
of provisional measures is also prohibited; The associations shall 
insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it is 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Zagger, supra note 46. 
 53 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 9 ¶ 9. 
 54 Id. at 13 ¶ 14. 
 55 Id. at 9 ¶ 9. 
 56 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
 57 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 13 ¶ 14 (referencing paragraph 
31 of the Interlocutory Judgment & Articles 59, 66 of the FIFA Statutes). 
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prohibited to take disputes in the association or disputes affecting 
leagues, members of leagues, clubs, members of clubs, players, 
officials and other association officials to ordinary courts of law, 
unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions 
specifically provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of 
law. Instead of recourse to ordinary courts of law, provision shall 
be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an 
independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognized 
under the rules of the association or confederation or to CAS.58 
 
 58 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Statutes, Regulations 
Governing the Application of the Statutes: Standing Orders of the Congress, 47–49 ¶¶ 66-
68 (April 2015) (emphasis added) (stating the FIFA statutes in existence in 2015 when the 
initial dispute was filed).  The statutes of interest are reprinted below. 
“#66 Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
1. FIFA recognizes the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) with 
headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes between FIFA, Members, 
Confederations, Leagues, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials, Intermediaries and licensed 
match agents. 
2. The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration shall apply to the 
proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, 
Swiss law. 
  #67 Jurisdiction of CAS: 
1. Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies and against decisions 
passed by Confederations, Members or Leagues shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days 
of notification of the decision in question. 
2. Recourse may only be made to CAS after all other internal channels have been 
exhausted. 
3. CAS, however, does not deal with appeals arising from: 
a) Violations of the Laws of the Game; 
b) Suspensions of up to four matches or up to three months (with the exception of doping 
decisions); 
c) Decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly constituted arbitration 
tribunal recognized under the rules of an Association or Confederation may be made. 
4. The appeal shall not have a suspensive effect. The appropriate FIFA body or, 
alternatively, CAS may order the appeal to have a suspensive effect. 
5. FIFA is entitled to appeal to CAS directly against any internally final and binding 
doping-related decision passed in particular by the Confederations, Members or Leagues 
in accordance with the provisions set out in the FIFA Anti-Doping Regulations. 
6. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is entitled to appeal to CAS against any 
internally final and binding doping-related decision passed in particular by FIFA, the 
Confederations, Members or Leagues in accordance with the provisions set out in the FIFA 
Anti-Doping Regulations. 
#68 Obligation: 
1. The Confederations, Members and Leagues shall agree to recognise CAS as an 
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The Brussels Court concluded that the will of the drafters cannot 
apply because the arbitration clause is too general to be recognized 
under Belgian law.59  This generality is illustrated by the clause’s 
failure to mention a limited applicability to “sports disputes.”60  
Rather, as a matter of Belgian law, the arbitration clause fails to 
present a “specific legal relationship” that is necessary to constitute 
a valid arbitration agreement.61  The Court of Appeals was set to 
hear arguments on the broader issues of TPO rules, but no record 
has been released on a judgment.62 
In response to the Brussels Court’s ruling, ICAS commented 
that most reports “do not properly reflect the reasons” of the Court 
of Appeals; rather, the Court actually said the arbitration Clause 
between FIFA and RFC Seraing lacked specificity because it did 
not limit automatic arbitration to “sports-related” conflicts, 
violative of Swiss law.63  ICAS characterized the Court’s holding as 
 
independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members, affiliated Players and 
Officials comply with the decisions passed by CAS.  The same obligation shall apply to 
intermediaries and licensed match agents. 
2. Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the 
FIFA regulations.  Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional measures 
is also prohibited. 
3. The Associations shall insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it 
is prohibited to take disputes in the Association or disputes affecting Leagues, members of 
Leagues, Clubs, members of clubs, Players, Officials and other Association Officials to 
ordinary courts of law, unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions specifically 
provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of law. Instead of recourse to ordinary 
courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an 
independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognized under the rules of the 
association or confederation or to CAS. 
The Associations shall also ensure that this stipulation is implemented in the Association, 
if necessary by imposing a binding obligation on its members.  The Associations shall 
impose sanctions on any party that fails to respect this obligation and ensure that any 
appeal against such sanctions shall likewise be strictly submitted to arbitration, and not to 
ordinary courts of law.”  Id. 
 59 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 13 ¶ 14. 
 60 Id. at 14 ¶ 15. 
 61 Simon Grossobel, Brussel’s Court of Appeal Challenges CAS Jurisdiction Clause 
in FIFA Statutes, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/brussel-s-court-appeal-challenges-cas-
jurisdiction-clause-fifa-statutes [https://perma.cc/9E5Q-JE9G]. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Media Release, Int’l Council of Arbitration for Sport ICAS/CAS, Statement of the 
Int’l Council for Sport (ICAS) Regarding the Case RFC Seraing/Doyen 
Sport/FIFA/UEFA/URBSF (Sept. 11, 2018), http://www.tas-
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narrower than the media’s interpretation, believing that its 
generality was a drafting error that will “not affect the jurisdiction 
of CAS globally.”64  However, it is undeniable that this case has 
opened the door to broader questions about the CAS’s authority, 
organization and effectiveness. 
IV. Implications to the International Sports World 
What does this ruling mean for the CAS? Will its institutional 
legitimacy be questioned or its binding power on parties be diluted?  
While the Brussels Court opinion can be interpreted as narrow in its 
holding, it opens these questions up for discussion.  As a result of 
the ruling, domestic courts may now have the authority to hear 
appeals in sporting disputes that were previously sent directly to the 
CAS.65  This deterrence would strip the CAS’s autonomous control 
over international sports conflicts, severely harming its authority, as 
its power and legitimacy stems from its position as the sole 
arbitration tribunal for sports conflicts.  The implications of this 
change will affect all national and international sports 
organizations, most notably large football federations.  Due to 
football’s status as the world’s most popular and most lucrative 
sport, the proper handling of large legal disputes is a central 
concern.66 
The biggest resulting change to the sports world will be in the 
location of appeals and the law applied in such cases.  Rather than 
 
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ICAS_statement_11.09.18.pdf [hereinafter ICAS Media 
Release] [https://perma.cc/869T-BDTH]. 
 64 Id.  The ICAS believes that this case will not affect CAS internationally because 
the ruling will simply require the drafting of more specific arbitration clauses.  The ICAS 
also addressed the connection between the present case and a 2016 case in the same court.  
See Zagger, supra note 46 (“The Belgian court decision comes after the CAS faced serious 
questions in a case involving German five-time Olympic gold medalist speed skater 
Claudia Pechstein, who challenged a two-year suspension for irregular blood tests that she 
said could be explained by an inherited blood condition.  A German court ruled that the 
CAS had not given Pechstein a fair hearing because the closed list of CAS arbitrators is 
biased in favor of international sports governing bodies. But, ultimately, that decision was 
reversed in favor of the CAS by the German Federal Court of Justice, the highest court for 
civil appeals in Germany, which found she had voluntarily agreed to arbitration in the 
CAS.”). 
 65 Diamond, supra note 3, ¶ 5. 
 66 Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 223 (“There is, therefore, a great deal at stake in sport 
at the global and European levels—not only on but also, and perhaps more so, off the field 
of play.”). 
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the CAS reviewing cases and issuing rulings based on previously 
agreed upon law or Swiss law, these cases may now be subject to 
the laws of individual states.67  The interactions between 
international and national regimes will become an important 
component to consider as appeals bring greater attention and 
consideration to the nature and global acceptance of the CAS.  
Specifically, “[i]n spite of [the] success [of the transnational nature 
of sports institutions], the existence of a lex sportiva is not 
universally accepted, in so far as some domestic orders have 
affirmed state law sovereignty over sport norms by contesting the 
legal nature of these rules.”68  Players may start resorting to state 
adjudication, rather than appealing to the CAS because it presents 
them with a more neutral determining body.69 
Additionally, the expansive power of large sports federations 
makes it difficult for individual players and agencies to have equal 
bargaining power.70  Rather, the current “[r]eliance on [tribunals] 
may deter athletes from seeking alternative remedies such as 
adjudication . . . and some of their decisions, particularly those 
involving restraint-of-trade claims, may be unenforceable by 
municipal courts.”71  As it stands now, there is no viable way for 
players to improve their bargaining power.  With the international 
federations so closely integrated with the CAS, players are forced 
to accept the proffered contracts without any alterations to the 
arbitration clauses.72  The unequal bargaining power between 
 
 67 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R45 (2017) (Eng.) (“The Panel shall 
decide the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of 
such a choice, according to Swiss law.  The parties may authorize the Panel to decide ex 
aequo et bono.”). 
 68 Casini, supra note 8, at 442. 
 69 As later discussed in this Note, the interconnectedness of the CAS with large sports 
federations inherently adds risks of coercion and bias into the appeal decisions of the CAS.  
This partisan make-up is further enhanced by the unequal bargaining power between large 
sports federations and individual players.  
 70 Id. at 461 n.80 (“Though it is doubtful that athletes are truly free to decide whether 
to sign or not these ad hoc clauses embodied in sporting institutions’ statutes.”). 
 71 Nafziger, supra note 28, at 507. 
 72 See Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Discriminatory and Unfair, PUB. CITIZEN, 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2019) https://www.citizen.org/article/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-
are-discriminatory-and-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/8DUY-NRXS] (“In addition to the denial 
of consumers’ and employees’ rights to seek remedies in court, arbitration between two 
parties with unequal bargaining power is too often a discriminatory and one-sided process, 
benefitting the corporations mandating it.”). 
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players and federations supports the idea that domestic courts might 
be the only judicial body with the interests and protection of the 
players in mind.73 
This challenge to the CAS’s jurisdiction raises further questions 
as to its legitimacy.  While it “would be possible in theory that one 
State imposes its own decisions during sports events held in its own 
territory and against the will of the ‘authorité international 
[International Federations or the CAS],’ that State would not be 
allowed to host any international sport competition.”74  
Additionally, the “main difficulty [of being subject to one State’s 
law] is that one [court] may potentially end up with two 
contradictory decisions: one issued by the Belgian courts, 
enforceable in Belgium only, and the original one issued by the CAS 
(and which was confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal), 
enforceable in the rest of the world.”75  This tension between 
national and international law was seen during the 2006 
jurisdictional challenge in UCI v. Landaluce and Real Federación 
Española de Ciclismo.76  The case involved two cyclists that tested 
positive for doping and who alleged that a Spanish law forbade 
arbitration recourse in the context of doping infractions.77   
 
The court remarked on this conflict of law by stressing that: 
 
[s]tates and international sports federations are not rivals for 
authority; on the contrary, their roles are complementary.  States 
are concerned only with the conduct of those who fall within the 
reach of their laws, while international federations administer 
competitions within the scope of their activity . . . National 
sovereignty, as expressed in a sports disciplinary measure decided 
by a national authority, is in principle and by its nature limited to 
national territorial application.  A national decision may, 
however, be replaced by a decision of the international authority 
 
 73 Infra note 69.  
 74 Casini, supra note 8, at 463.  It appears that ICAS would oppose any competitions 
hosted by states that fail to provide the CAS with discretion and authority over sports 
disputes. 
 75 ICAS Media Release, supra note 63. 
 76 World Anti-Doping Agency v. Federación Mexicana de Fútbol, CAS 
2006/A/1149, 2007/A/1211, ¶¶ 30-31 (May 16, 2007) (quoting UCI v. Landaluce, TAS 
2006/A/1119 (¶¶ 49–50, translated from French)). 
 77 Id. 
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– CAS – in order to ensure the required uniform application of 
law.  True, it is theoretically conceivable that a state would impose 
its national decisions with respect to international events taking 
place on its territory even in disregard of the international 
authority.  Such an attitude would, however, contradict the effort 
to fight doping on the international level, and could lead to the 
exclusion of the concerned state from the organisation of 
international competitions.  It would be surprising for a state to 
wish to adopt such a posture[.]78 
 
Currently, the most appropriate location for international sports 
disputes to be heard is thus unsettled and unknown.  In support of 
domestic courts hearing these cases is the increased protection 
afforded to the players and private parties, further suggesting that 
domestic courts may be better equipped to level–the rather unlevel–
playing field between large international sports federations and the 
subservient players and agencies.79  Yet, UCI curbs this theory by 
highlighting the contradictory nature of having domestic courts 
fighting sports issues on an international level.80  
Without a uniform ruling, every player and agency will be held 
to different standards.  In addition, states that refuse to accept the 
jurisdiction of the CAS will not be seen as adequate locations for 
hosting international sports competitions.81  While no major bodies 
are currently challenging the authority of the CAS, it remains an 
incipient issue that will eventually gain momentum and is ripe for 
international reformation. 
V. The CAS through the Lens of American Legal Tradition 
In analyzing the CAS through the lens of American law, the 
tribunal’s very nature seems suspect and counter to many 
 
 78 Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added). 
 79 With “States [] concerned only with the conduct of those who fall within the reach 
of their laws” they are not coerced by allegiances to sports federations and can thus better 
protect the interests of the individual parties.  See id.  
 80  See id. (“Such an attitude would, however, contradict the effort to fight doping on 
the international level, and could lead to the exclusion of the concerned state from the 
organisation of international competitions.”).  
 81 See id. (inferring that hosting international competitions would be difficult if there 
is an “exclusion of the concerned state from the organisation of international 
competitions”).  
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fundamental legal traditions in America.82  These characteristics 
further touch on weaknesses and problems inherent in the CAS’s 
nature and in the tribunal’s relationships with dominant sports 
organizations.  The notable areas for concern include the CAS’s 
tight integration with large sports federations and the Court’s lack 
of impartiality and precedence.83 
The organizational structure of the CAS inherently fosters an 
inability of arbitrators to be neutral and impartial.  The CAS “may 
sometimes be [seen as] little more than executive panels in 
disguise”84 composed of individuals from the very parties that 
appeal to the tribunal.  These executive panels, including the CAS 
and ICAS, are often made of former athletes and former executives 
from large international sports associations with mixed loyalties.85  
Specifically, ICAS members are often chosen from International 
Sports Federations, Association of Summer Olympic IFs, 
Association of Winter Olympic IFs, Association of the National 
Olympic Committees and the International Olympic Committee.86 
 
 82 See Jan Ginter Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some 
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY 169, 179 (1968) (discussing the “postulate that judicial decisions are 
legitimate only when they rest on neutral principles from the duty of constitutional 
adjudication that [legal scholar Professor Herbert Wechsler] finds article III to impose on 
the courts”). 
 83 Daniel H. Yi, Turning Medals into Metal: Evaluating the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport as an International Tribunal, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, 
31-32 (“Prior to 1994, the IOC exercised direct oversight of the CAS. After the Paris 
Agreement, however, ICAS was created to take on this duty. However, Olympic 
institutions are still very much in the picture, retaining substantial influence over both the 
ICAS appointment process. In fact, ICAS’ entire twenty-person roster is appointed either 
directly or indirectly by Olympic institutions. Based on its membership requirements, there 
are four ways that ICAS (and therefore the CAS) remains firmly entangled with Olympic 
institutions. First, Olympic institutions directly appoint 60% (12 out of 20 total) of all CAS 
governors. Second, the twelve ICAS members appointed by Olympic institutions have sole 
discretion in appointing the remaining eight members. Third, up to sixteen members of 
ICAS can, and mostly are, members of Olympics institutions. In fact, at last check, twelve 
current members of ICAS are also high-ranking members of some Olympic institution. 
Finally, there is no life tenure in ICAS; members are only guaranteed a four-year term. If 
their appointing body (most likely, an Olympic institution) is not satisfied with their 
performance after four years, Olympic bodies can simply refuse to re-appoint a recalcitrant 
member. Assuming that the Paris Agreement was intended to truly emancipate CAS from 
Olympic institutions, ICAS appears to be a feeble attempt to accomplish this goal.”). 
 84 Nafziger, supra note 28, at 506. 
 85 See CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. S4 (2017) (Eng.). 
 86 Id. art. S4 ¶¶ a-c. 
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The tribunal is so heavily integrated with these federations 
because the very members of the CAS are appointed by ICAS to 
join the Court.87  “Section S6 of the CAS Code gives ICAS the 
power to appoint CAS arbitrators, amend the CAS Code, and elect 
the presidents of the Ordinary and Appeals Divisions of the CAS.  
In essence, the ICAS has overwhelming influence over the 
management, administration, and regulation of the CAS.”88  The 
irony of this is that a driving reason for creating the CAS was to 
have a court free from the powers of the international federations 
and their influential nature.89  The prevalence of “enforced 
arbitration” clauses and the interconnectedness of the sports world 
illustrate how closely affiliated the CAS is with international sports 
associations. 
From an American legal system perspective, CAS is antithetical 
to many of the system’s founding principles.  Rather, CAS 
possesses similar characteristics, including inequalities in 
bargaining power through arbitration agreements, to that of private 
organizations like the National Football League (NFL).90  The NFL 
invokes a “collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the 
NFL Player’s Association (NFLPA), the labor union representing 
professional football players, and the owners of football teams.”91  
The CBA parallels the CAS in two respects: (1) the inequality of 
bargaining power between the CBA, the NFLPA, and the team 
owners mirrors that of the CAS, team owners, and the (little 
represented) players; and (2) the biased authority over appellate 
hearings in the CBA with relation to their Commissioner and in the 
CAS with relation to the intra-court selection for arbitrators that is 
highly influenced by sports federations.92 
 
 87 Id. art. S14. 
 88 Melissa Hewitt, An Unbalanced Act: A Criticism of How the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport Issues Unjustly Harsh Sanctions by Attempting to Regulate Doping in Sport, 22 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 769, 775 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 89 See Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 225. 
 90 Jennifer R. Bondulich, Rescuing the “Supreme Court” of Sports: Reforming The 
Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Member Selection Procedures, 42 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 275, 311-19 (2016). 
 91 Id. at 312. 
 92 See id. at 311-22 (“Similar to the binding arbitration clauses found in contracts 
between athletes and their respective athletic federations, under the CBA, players are 
bound to the arbitration procedures set forth and agreed to by the NFLPA and the owners 
of the teams.”). 
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The CBA provides the commissioner of the NFL with both 
“discretionary and disciplinary power over conduct considered 
‘detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of 
professional football.’  Essentially a catch-all, the CBA gives the 
commissioner the express authority to define the scope of 
detrimental conduct and to impose discipline he deems fit.”93  Even 
more alarming, the CBA allows for the Commissioner, with only 
little oversight by the NFPLA, to “‘serve as [a] hearing officer in 
any appeal under his discretion.’  The NFL commissioner thus has 
exclusive authority to choose the arbitrators in the appeals process, 
and may even select himself.”94  The Commissioner is provided with 
“the power to be both judge and jury” with the ability to issue 
binding decisions with little “neutral third-party oversight.”95  The 
essence of this unchecked power and unequal bargaining is 
alarming and presents high risks for “structural imbalance and bias” 
in both the NFL and the CAS.96 
 
The structural imbalance can clearly be seen in this break-down: 
 
There are 193 governments that have delegated the CAS to 
adjudicate sports disputes on their behalf, which means that the 
power of lex sportive is currently in the hands of 330 individuals. 
The interests of tens of thousands of athletes are at stake, yet 
power is centralized in the hands of the few. When it comes to 
fairness, there is a great cost to athletes subject to the CAS’s 
jurisdiction because the CAS will inevitably “disagree with, rule 
against, or render interpretations that run counter to what [national 
governments] might have wanted, and what the democratic 
majority might prefer.”  The CAS has a monopoly over the 
international sports arena, and it is subject to the minimalist of 
review standards.97 
 
 93 Id. at 313. 
 94 Id. at 313-14 (“Although this power was collectively bargained for by the NFL 
and the NFLPA, it is drastically different than typical arbitration clauses, in which ‘a 
neutral third-party arbiter is appointed by both parties to make a binding decision with-out 
preferential treatment to one side.’”). 
 95 Id. at 314. 
 96 Bondulich, supra note 90, at 319 (discussing the inability for “the president of the 
[Appeals Arbitration] [D]ivision, who is selected by ICAS through individual institutions 
and the IOC [to] be able to select an unbiased arbitrator”). 
 97 Hewitt, supra note 88, at 780-81. 
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As previously established in this paper, sports are immensely 
important in our society.  They present a platform that intermixes 
extreme financial power and influence with a massive public 
following.  A structural imbalance at the top level, directly affecting 
the individuals that generate a collective following in the public, is 
an important issue that the Belgian Court of Appeals ruling brings 
to light.   
The structural imbalance of the CAS is further exploited by the 
court’s power, amidst its partisan make-up, to issue advisory 
opinions “on juridical matters concerning sport” that directly shape 
sports internationally with the “minimalist of review standards.”98  
Specifically, the CAS can “provide for summary conciliation . . . 
[and] advise international federations and other sports organizations 
on problems related to their structures and procedures.”99  
Ultimately, “[t]he competence of the CAS to give advisory 
opinions, in particular, suggests a fertile source of international 
sports law . . . so as to render its prescriptions and sanctions 
‘justified’ [and] more proportional, in the eyes of national 
judges.”100  But, the CAS’s authorization to issue advisory opinions 
is more evidence of the CAS’s close affiliation with international 
federations. 
How can the CAS make objective and unbiased decisions on 
sports conflicts when its operations are interdependent to those of 
the international sports organizations?  This very practice runs 
against the United States practice of forbidding federal courts from 
issuing advisory opinions because it blurs the line of separation of 
powers.101  The insular nature of the CAS becomes tainted when it 
so closely associates itself with the same parties that bring it 
appeals.  The result of these relationships is clearly seen through the 
CAS’s acceptance of FIFA’s sanctions as proportionate to RFC 
Seraing’s violation, without any consideration to the suitability of 
 
 98 See id; Nafziger, supra note 28, at 507. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 508. 
 101 Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions By Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
769, 769 (referring to Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution in which the 
“affirmative grant of authority to federal courts . . . to hear and decide cases or 
controversies has been interpreted to prohibit these courts from giving advisory 
opinions.”). 
66 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
the enforced arbitration clause.102 
While international law inherently provides for a different 
nature than that of American law, it is also important to compare the 
institutional safe-holds that are present and absent in both systems.  
The CAS tribunal is not bound by precedent and has the freedom to 
review every case de novo, even with possible disregard to the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals below it.103  This absence of binding 
precedent seems inherently suspect and questions how much trust 
can be placed in the Court’s constructed lex sportiva.  Additionally, 
it highlights the absence of checks on the Court’s power.  As the 
CAS operates through arbitration requirements forcing appeals to 
their tribunals, the Court has the ability to supersede national court 
systems and other State law when coming to its binding 
conclusions.104  The unlimited power of the CAS is further enhanced 
by the high stakes of their decisions, as the Court has the sole ability 
to uniformly alter sport internationally.105 
While the uniform and insular nature of the CAS positively 
contributes to the international sports world, it is concerning that the 
Court’s power can continue to grow freely and endlessly.  With 
concerns for the neutrality of the tribunal amidst minimal checks on 
its power, the growing power of the CAS raises concerns such as: 
further disadvantages for players without improvements to their 
bargaining power; further opportunities for the CAS’s “few” to 
issue policy decisions that directly impact players and their 
respective agents, coaches, and federations; and further chances for 
the “few” to risk the integrity of the very sports that are enjoyed 
internationally for biased gain.  By reorganizing the selection 
process for the CAS, some oversight will be added to the tribunal to 
assure minimal checks to its authority. 
VI. Recommendations 
The Brussels Court of Appeals decision is a small flicker of 
 
 102 See Mavromati, supra note 4, at 3. 
 103 MCARDLE, supra note 35, at 48. 
 104 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 17 (“An award pronounced by the CAS 
is final and binding on the parties from the moment it is communicated. It may in particular 
be enforced in accordance with the New York Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, which more than 125 countries have signed.“). 
 105 See id. (possessing the ability to issue “final and binding” judgments provides CAS 
with the power and influence to single-handedly shape sports across the world). 
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resistance to the CAS that will likely die out before any real 
movement is initiated.  While there are fundamental characteristics 
of the CAS that are worrisome, specifically in its close relationship 
to authoritative sports associations and its lack of binding precedent, 
the CAS is likely to remain unchanged as its existence is too highly 
valued in international sports. 
The CAS’s position as the sole arbitral body with internationally 
respected decisions is too advantageous to completely reform.  
Instead, minor reforms to protect its objectivity must be 
implemented to constrain the influence of international sports 
federations.  An unbiased and uninfluenced panel can be achieved 
through changes in the selection process for the CAS panels.  
Instead of having ICAS – oftentimes itself made of IF officers – 
directly selecting the CAS arbitrators, there should be an external 
selection process.  This process will balance a candidate’s former 
arbitration experience with his or her knowledge of sport more 
objectively than the ICAS. 
Secondly, the arbitration clauses for all major sports federations 
should be reviewed by the CAS to help the clauses better reflect an 
equal bargaining power between players, third parties, and 
international federations.  Additionally, both a heavier involvement 
of the players in making these recommendations to the sports 
federations and an educational program to teach players what they 
ascribe to when signing agreements are needed.  Unequal 
bargaining power is the natural result of a financially equipped and 
experienced sports federation on the one side, with a player that 
likely lacks the expertise to comprehend the complexity of these 
agreements on the other side.  Educational programs provided by 
the CAS to the sports federation players will help to eliminate the 
unequal bargaining power that exploits players. 
VII. Conclusion 
The CAS will continue to grow in power and influence until 
institutional safe-holds are put in place to restrict its power.  It is 
important to retain a uniform ruling body that employs decisions 
collectively followed by all national and international sports 
federations; the CAS’s existence is necessary to assure that sports 
retain their integrity and legitimacy in pursuit of honest play.  But 
the importance of the CAS does not rid it of the necessity for 
institutional safe-holds that check its power and neutrality.  
Unfortunately, with the current nature of the tribunal, this 
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continuously-growing power represents the subsequently growing 
power of the federations, the very problem that spurred the creation 
of the CAS.  With a more objective look into its operations and with 
a mission focused on positive reform, the CAS may actually stay 
within the sidelines of its originally-bound field. 
 
 
